Posts Tagged the argument from disagreement

Wedgwood on Moral Knowledge and Moral Epistemology pt. II

Section Three: The Epistemology of Normative Belief Part II: Disagreement and the A Priori Having articulated a theory of how we can come to have moral knowledge (see here), Wedgwood turns to whether such knowledge is a priori, and if so, how there can be such widespread moral disagreement. Wedgwood takes Kant’s work on the […]

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The Incommensurability of Values (and objectivity, subjectivity, and reason)

Jmeqvist posted an excellent entry on the inability of interpersonal reasoning-based dialogue to resolve all value conflicts in a polity, and although I disagree with his thesis, today I want to touch on a difficulty for moral/value discourse he points to, and what consequences it suggests for metaethical theorizing. Jmeqvist notes that value conflict resolution […]

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The Argument From Disagreement (and moral vs. non-moral facts, realism and intuitionism)

Earlier today I posted an entry on how ethical dilemmas and moral disagreements can be caused by disagreement on the non-moral facts of a case, such that moral disagreements aren’t by themselves reasons to doubt the objectivity of morality, as the moral anti-realist holds; now seems a good time to explore the ways in which […]

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Genetically Modified Babies (and moral duties, harm, and moral disagreement)

The Washington Post reports that the FDA has begun reviewing a process of canceling out genetically inherited diseases by creating embryos with three genetic parents. While the article explains the science and the history of the process quite well, it fails to go into detail about the “ethical issues” posed by such a process, though […]

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“Moral values aren’t absolute, but aren’t arbitrary either” (reblog)

Originally posted on SelfAwarePatterns:
(Photo credit: Wikipedia) I’m working on another post with details about foundational moral instincts, but after some discussion on the ‘Morality arises from instincts‘ post, I realized that I failed to make a couple of things clear.  So, I’m inserting this additional post to do that. First, let me clarify that,…

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Moral Twin Earth pt I (and the open question argument, Cornell realism, and the causal theory of reference)

One of the more reoccurring sci-fi plot devices is that of traveling to a “twin” earth, where persons are for the most part the same, except that different events have occurred; a recent heated debate in metaethics has been on what occurs when, stipulating that each party has discovered the objective moral truths of the […]

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Moral Naturalism and Non-Naturalism (and moral disagreement)

Note: I was working on an addition to my “About” page wherein I attempted to briefly state my meta-ethical views when I noticed that I had gotten carried away and written far more than was appropriate for the page. Thus I have decided to share it as a post.  Among metaethical options, I think that […]

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