Posts Tagged non-reducibility

Wedgwood on the Compatibility of Naturalism and Irreducibility

An argument for the irreducible naturalism thesis is advanced in the next chapter, and Wedgwood’s intention is to show that irreducibility is compatible with naturalism, such that he is not arguing for naturalism, just for this compatibility thesis, and so assumes a strong version of naturalism, as by extension, if irreducibility is compatible with a […]

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Ralph Wedgwood on The Metaphysics of Normative Facts

Part Two: The Metaphysics of Normative Facts In part two of The Nature of Normativity, Wedgwood delves into the messy metaphysics of normativity, and takes some pretty remarkable positions, which include, that “the intentional is normative”, that normative facts are causally efficacious, and that though normative facts and mental states are irreducible, his view is […]

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Ralph Wedgwood on Cornell Realism and Australian Realism (moral semantics)

Having defeated expressivism (see here for his arguments) in a way that suggests the necessity of a truth-conditional semantics for normative statements, Wedgwood outlines what a factualist semantics must accomplish, and in so doing, reveals the failure of two factualist semantic theories: the causal theory put forward by the Cornell realists, and the conceptual analysis theory […]

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Moral Naturalism and Non-Naturalism (and moral disagreement)

Note: I was working on an addition to my “About” page wherein I attempted to briefly state my meta-ethical views when I noticed that I had gotten carried away and written far more than was appropriate for the page. Thus I have decided to share it as a post.  Among metaethical options, I think that […]

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