Posts Tagged Internalism and externalism

Thoughts on Ethical Vegetarianism pt II (the “all things are alive” response and moral motivation)

I’ve been engaging in some debate on the moral merits of a vegetarian diet and in doing so I’ve found myself frequently responding to the interesting argument that runs: all things are alive, so a vegetarian diet is not morally better than an omnivorous diet. I say it is an interesting argument not because it […]

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Wedgwood on Moral Knowledge and Moral Epistemology pt I

Section Three: The Epistemology of Normative Belief. Part I: The Status of Normative Intuitions (Part II will cover the next chapter of the section on moral epistemology, entitled, “Disagreement and the A Priori”) Wedgwood turns to the crucial question of how we might be justified in moral beliefs, using again the thesis that the intentional […]

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Ralph Wedgwood on Cornell Realism and Australian Realism (moral semantics)

Having defeated expressivism (see here for his arguments) in a way that suggests the necessity of a truth-conditional semantics for normative statements, Wedgwood outlines what a factualist semantics must accomplish, and in so doing, reveals the failure of two factualist semantic theories: the causal theory put forward by the Cornell realists, and the conceptual analysis theory […]

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Ralph Wedgwood on Internalist Moral Motivation

I recently picked up Ralph Wedgwood’s The Nature of Normativity, being one of the more recent exhaustive defenses of moral realism. I’ve taken to writing summaries of the books I read, rather than just annotating them, in an effort to better understand and internalize the overall arguments of books, and though I will likely post […]

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Notes on Robert Audi’s Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character, pt IV: Practical Reason and the Foundations of Ethics

Section IV: Practical Reason and the Foundations of Ethics “Autonomy, Reason and Desire” In a way, this essay is best understood as a further defense of the theory of responsibility Audi argues for in “Responsible Action and Virtuous Character” (in pt III). The intent of the current essay is to develop the conception of autonomy […]

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Notes on Audi’s Moral Knowledge & Ethical Character, pt I: Moral Epistemology

I’ve frequently criticized virtue ethics on this blog, so it seems worthwhile to comment on Robert Audi’s theories on moral realism, which seek to integrate an Aristotelian virtue conception into an otherwise intuitionistic Kantianism (or Kantian intuitionism; Audi admits either description of his view works, but as his epistemology is intuitionistic for the most part, […]

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On Undesignated Handicap Parking (and moral motivation)

Today I pulled into a parking spot closest to the entrance of a coffee-shop. Realizing that it was probably reserved for persons with handicaps, I looked around to see if it was indeed reserved. Finding that it wasn’t so reserved, I concluded that I could legally park there. But was it morally right for me […]

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