Posts Tagged ethical intuitionism

The Is/Ought Gap pt. II: On Its Implications for Reductionism and Intuitionism

I’ve very much enjoyed the excellent discussions that have been occurring in the comments section of my recent post on the Is/ought gap. All of the commentators have been provocative and informative, but Larry posted some fantastically critical remarks of two positions I was advancing in that post, (I) that the is/ought thesis has no […]

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The Is/Ought Gap: It’s real but doesn’t pose a problem for “scientific moralists”

In the past two weeks I’ve stumbled upon blog entries that argued for a “scientific morality”, and in doing so challenged the “is/ought thesis”, which seems to be a rite of passage to be a naturalist these days. Unfortunately, the writers misunderstand the “is/ought” thesis, and so their arguments against it fail (but both entries […]

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Wedgwood on Moral Knowledge and Moral Epistemology pt I

Section Three: The Epistemology of Normative Belief. Part I: The Status of Normative Intuitions (Part II will cover the next chapter of the section on moral epistemology, entitled, “Disagreement and the A Priori”) Wedgwood turns to the crucial question of how we might be justified in moral beliefs, using again the thesis that the intentional […]

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Notes on Robert Audi’s Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character, pt V: Conclusion

Conclusion “The Moral Justification of Actions and the Ethical Character of Persons” In this concluding essay, Audi makes further points on how a Rossian intuitionistic pluralism can be supplemented with Kant’s categorical imperative. A moral theory can be normatively complete on two levels, the first being that the theory accounts for the diversity of moral […]

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Notes on Robert Audi’s Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character, pt IV: Practical Reason and the Foundations of Ethics

Section IV: Practical Reason and the Foundations of Ethics “Autonomy, Reason and Desire” In a way, this essay is best understood as a further defense of the theory of responsibility Audi argues for in “Responsible Action and Virtuous Character” (in pt III). The intent of the current essay is to develop the conception of autonomy […]

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Notes on Audi’s Moral Knowledge & Ethical Character, pt I: Moral Epistemology

I’ve frequently criticized virtue ethics on this blog, so it seems worthwhile to comment on Robert Audi’s theories on moral realism, which seek to integrate an Aristotelian virtue conception into an otherwise intuitionistic Kantianism (or Kantian intuitionism; Audi admits either description of his view works, but as his epistemology is intuitionistic for the most part, […]

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On Undesignated Handicap Parking (and moral motivation)

Today I pulled into a parking spot closest to the entrance of a coffee-shop. Realizing that it was probably reserved for persons with handicaps, I looked around to see if it was indeed reserved. Finding that it wasn’t so reserved, I concluded that I could legally park there. But was it morally right for me […]

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Weakness of the Will and Particularism (and Dancy, cognitivist internalism, and moral motivation)

I tend to be skeptical of moral particularism, but after reading Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations (click here for my review), wherein particularism was dismissed out of hand, I decided I better explore particularism more thoroughly – after all, it wasn’t long ago that ethical intuitionism was too hastily dismissed. So I picked up a copy of […]

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Review of “Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations”

Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations I tend to shy away from anthologies, as such collections often bring together essays not in proper dialogue (as opposed to an author’s dialogue with himself throughout the course of his book); this collection is an exception, most likely due to the narrow focus on a epistemological view in morality. In fact, […]

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The Incommensurability of Values (and objectivity, subjectivity, and reason)

Jmeqvist posted an excellent entry on the inability of interpersonal reasoning-based dialogue to resolve all value conflicts in a polity, and although I disagree with his thesis, today I want to touch on a difficulty for moral/value discourse he points to, and what consequences it suggests for metaethical theorizing. Jmeqvist notes that value conflict resolution […]

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