Posts Tagged moral perception

A Critique of Jonathan Dancy’s “Moral Reasons” (Against Dancy’s Particularism)

As noted in a previous entry, I recently acquired a copy of Dancy’s Moral Reasons, the most systematic contemporary account of moral particularism on offer, due to a concern that particularism might be being dismissed unfairly. Dancy is a brilliant philosopher, and his work is a joy to read, as he makes compelling and excitingly […]

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Weakness of the Will and Particularism (and Dancy, cognitivist internalism, and moral motivation)

I tend to be skeptical of moral particularism, but after reading Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations (click here for my review), wherein particularism was dismissed out of hand, I decided I better explore particularism more thoroughly – after all, it wasn’t long ago that ethical intuitionism was too hastily dismissed. So I picked up a copy of […]

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Review of “Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations”

Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations I tend to shy away from anthologies, as such collections often bring together essays not in proper dialogue (as opposed to an author’s dialogue with himself throughout the course of his book); this collection is an exception, most likely due to the narrow focus on a epistemological view in morality. In fact, […]

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House of Cards’ Frank Underwood (and virtue ethics, moral explanations, and counterfactuals)

I tend to be skeptical of virtue ethics, on a metaethical level, due to the implausibility of attributing moral properties to persons – for me, moral properties seem like the sort of entity that might only obtain for actions and states of affairs – but Kevin Spacey’s Frank Underwood in House of Cards seems to […]

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The Call of Duties pt II (Thoughts on Ross’s The Right and The Good [on partial knowledge, epistemic access, and luck])

In a previous entry, I explicated W.D. Ross’s argument that “morally right action” does not mean the same thing as “morally good action”, with special attention given to the premise that was the most essential to his argument: it is the not the case that it is obligatory to act from a good motive. His […]

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Moral Naturalism and Non-Naturalism (and moral disagreement)

Note: I was working on an addition to my “About” page wherein I attempted to briefly state my meta-ethical views when I noticed that I had gotten carried away and written far more than was appropriate for the page. Thus I have decided to share it as a post.  Among metaethical options, I think that […]

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