Posts Tagged moral cognitivism

Ralph Wedgwood on Cornell Realism and Australian Realism (moral semantics)

Having defeated expressivism (see here for his arguments) in a way that suggests the necessity of a truth-conditional semantics for normative statements, Wedgwood outlines what a factualist semantics must accomplish, and in so doing, reveals the failure of two factualist semantic theories: the causal theory put forward by the Cornell realists, and the conceptual analysis theory […]

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Robert Audi on the Impersonality of Rational Desires

Since starting this blog, I have argued for moral realism in some form or other, but that is not to say that I have not entertained other metaethical positions before then – I used to be something of a moral nihilist that accepted morality as some type of social contract that was motivated by self-preservation. […]

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