Archive for October, 2014

Morality in Reservoir Dogs

I revisited one of my favorite films recently, the fiendishly repugnant, Reservoir Dogs, after a chance hearing of “Little Green Bag” in a commercial, the musical number that, over the opening credits, takes the audience from the pre-burglary breakfast to the post-burglary bloodbath. In reading some reviews and papers on the film, I noticed that […]

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The Is/Ought Gap pt. II: On Its Implications for Reductionism and Intuitionism

I’ve very much enjoyed the excellent discussions that have been occurring in the comments section of my recent post on the Is/ought gap. All of the commentators have been provocative and informative, but Larry posted some fantastically critical remarks of two positions I was advancing in that post, (I) that the is/ought thesis has no […]

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Cogito Ergo Su(m/n)day Review in the NY Times: Graziano’s Eliminativism

The New York Times Sunday review features a short article by Michael Graziano, a neuroscientist at Princeton, arguing for eliminativism. The gist of the piece is that subjective experiences are flawed approximations of data given by external stimuli structured by the mechanistic physical system that is the brain, such that it can be said that […]

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The Is/Ought Gap: It’s real but doesn’t pose a problem for “scientific moralists”

In the past two weeks I’ve stumbled upon blog entries that argued for a “scientific morality”, and in doing so challenged the “is/ought thesis”, which seems to be a rite of passage to be a naturalist these days. Unfortunately, the writers misunderstand the “is/ought” thesis, and so their arguments against it fail (but both entries […]

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Review of Mark Timmons’ Morality Without Foundations pt III (of III): on Timmons’ Contextualist Epistemology

Timmons then turns to matters of moral epistemology, arguing for a contextualist epistemology that borrows from foundationalist and coherentist views to develop an account of how regular persons can have justified moral beliefs – a criterion that he says the other epistemological views don’t take seriously enough. Timmons notes, before getting things going, that he […]

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