Posts Tagged moral reasons

Some Thoughts on Ethical Vegetarianism

About a week ago I decided to adopt a vegetarian diet. It wasn’t spurred by a sudden moral epiphany, rather I had wondered for some time whether a vegetarian diet was morally better than an omnivorous diet. I had convinced myself that eating meat was not immoral because it was perfectly natural, in an evolutionary […]

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Ralph Wedgwood on Cornell Realism and Australian Realism (moral semantics)

Having defeated expressivism (see here for his arguments) in a way that suggests the necessity of a truth-conditional semantics for normative statements, Wedgwood outlines what a factualist semantics must accomplish, and in so doing, reveals the failure of two factualist semantic theories: the causal theory put forward by the Cornell realists, and the conceptual analysis theory […]

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Notes on Robert Audi’s Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character, pt IV: Practical Reason and the Foundations of Ethics

Section IV: Practical Reason and the Foundations of Ethics “Autonomy, Reason and Desire” In a way, this essay is best understood as a further defense of the theory of responsibility Audi argues for in “Responsible Action and Virtuous Character” (in pt III). The intent of the current essay is to develop the conception of autonomy […]

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A Critique of Jonathan Dancy’s “Moral Reasons” (Against Dancy’s Particularism)

As noted in a previous entry, I recently acquired a copy of Dancy’s Moral Reasons, the most systematic contemporary account of moral particularism on offer, due to a concern that particularism might be being dismissed unfairly. Dancy is a brilliant philosopher, and his work is a joy to read, as he makes compelling and excitingly […]

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Weakness of the Will and Particularism (and Dancy, cognitivist internalism, and moral motivation)

I tend to be skeptical of moral particularism, but after reading Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations (click here for my review), wherein particularism was dismissed out of hand, I decided I better explore particularism more thoroughly – after all, it wasn’t long ago that ethical intuitionism was too hastily dismissed. So I picked up a copy of […]

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The Ethics of Love (care ethics, partiality, and pluralism)

With Valentine’s day upon us, now seems a good time to touch on a metaethical view I have on the whole neglected: care ethics, a moral methodology based in love. It’s an interesting approach to morality arguing that the most basic and preliminary ethical relationship is between a mother and her child, such that our […]

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McNaughton on W.D. Ross (and Particularism, Pluralism and the double weighing of duties)

One of the more interesting broad questions of metaethics is whether we can expect to craft moral theories that provide principles for right action that serve as guiding decision procedures. Moral pluralists argue that we can have a list of criteria for what makes actions right, but from there we must use practical judgment to […]

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