Posts Tagged factualism

Ralph Wedgwood on Cornell Realism and Australian Realism (moral semantics)

Having defeated expressivism (see here for his arguments) in a way that suggests the necessity of a truth-conditional semantics for normative statements, Wedgwood outlines what a factualist semantics must accomplish, and in so doing, reveals the failure of two factualist semantic theories: the causal theory put forward by the Cornell realists, and the conceptual analysis theory […]

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Ralph Wedgwood on Expressivism (moral semantics and truth)

Wedgwood sets his sight on the semantic project that is expressivism, the view that the fundamental explanations of the meaning of normative statements are the types of mental states that those statements express. This view is in contrast to the factualist approach, which holds that the fundamental explanation of the meaning of normative statements are […]

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