Posts Tagged metaethics

The Is/Ought Gap pt. II: On Its Implications for Reductionism and Intuitionism

I’ve very much enjoyed the excellent discussions that have been occurring in the comments section of my recent post on the Is/ought gap. All of the commentators have been provocative and informative, but Larry posted some fantastically critical remarks of two positions I was advancing in that post, (I) that the is/ought thesis has no […]

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Review of Mark Timmons’ Morality Without Foundations pt III (of III): on Timmons’ Contextualist Epistemology

Timmons then turns to matters of moral epistemology, arguing for a contextualist epistemology that borrows from foundationalist and coherentist views to develop an account of how regular persons can have justified moral beliefs – a criterion that he says the other epistemological views don’t take seriously enough. Timmons notes, before getting things going, that he […]

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Review of Mark Timmons’ Morality Without Foundations pt II (of III): on Timmons’ Contextualist Semantics

Timmons initiates his presentation of his positive view in a thorough chapter on contextualist moral semantics, first providing a general introduction to the semantic program. In contrast to the correspondence view of truth (the view of realists), for a sentence to be true according to contextual semantics is for it to have correct assertibility, where […]

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“Frank is not a bad person though he does bad actions?” (Reblog)

Originally posted on The Horizon and The Fringe:
There is a lovely blog called AusomeAwestin, and for the purposes of this post, I will address the author as Awestin. I cannot tell to whom the blog belongs, but nobody just writes on Mark Timmons in metaethics without at the very least being either a graduate…

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Review of Mark Timmons’ Morality Without Foundations pt I (of III)

Mark Timmons’ Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism is an indispensable contribution to contemporary metaethics, as it challenges deeply engrained assumptions of the field to articulate a new and exciting theory of moral irrealism. The book proceeds by articulating the criteria by which a metaethical theory must succeed; how the (at the time) […]

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Wedgwood on Moral Knowledge and Moral Epistemology pt. II

Section Three: The Epistemology of Normative Belief Part II: Disagreement and the A Priori Having articulated a theory of how we can come to have moral knowledge (see here), Wedgwood turns to whether such knowledge is a priori, and if so, how there can be such widespread moral disagreement. Wedgwood takes Kant’s work on the […]

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Wedgwood on Moral Knowledge and Moral Epistemology pt I

Section Three: The Epistemology of Normative Belief. Part I: The Status of Normative Intuitions (Part II will cover the next chapter of the section on moral epistemology, entitled, “Disagreement and the A Priori”) Wedgwood turns to the crucial question of how we might be justified in moral beliefs, using again the thesis that the intentional […]

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