Posts Tagged Robert Audi

Ralph Wedgwood on Cornell Realism and Australian Realism (moral semantics)

Having defeated expressivism (see here for his arguments) in a way that suggests the necessity of a truth-conditional semantics for normative statements, Wedgwood outlines what a factualist semantics must accomplish, and in so doing, reveals the failure of two factualist semantic theories: the causal theory put forward by the Cornell realists, and the conceptual analysis theory […]

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Notes on Robert Audi’s Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character, pt V: Conclusion

Conclusion “The Moral Justification of Actions and the Ethical Character of Persons” In this concluding essay, Audi makes further points on how a Rossian intuitionistic pluralism can be supplemented with Kant’s categorical imperative. A moral theory can be normatively complete on two levels, the first being that the theory accounts for the diversity of moral […]

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Notes on Robert Audi’s Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character, pt IV: Practical Reason and the Foundations of Ethics

Section IV: Practical Reason and the Foundations of Ethics “Autonomy, Reason and Desire” In a way, this essay is best understood as a further defense of the theory of responsibility Audi argues for in “Responsible Action and Virtuous Character” (in pt III). The intent of the current essay is to develop the conception of autonomy […]

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Notes on Robert Audi’s Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character, pt. III: Character, Responsibility and Virtue

Section III: Character, Responsibility and Virtue “Self-Deception, Rationalization, and the Ethics of Belief” While Audi is to be commended for the broad range of topics considered in this book, this essay is far too psychological for my taste, and so my comments will be brief, due to my lack of familiarity with the area. Audi’s […]

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Notes on Robert Audi’s Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character, pt II: Ethical Concepts and Moral Realism

Section II: Ethical Concepts and Moral Realism “Moral Epistemology and the Supervenience of Ethical Concepts” This essay focuses on the epistemological status of moral principles by attending to whether empiricism or rationalism is better suited for moral knowledge in light of the supervenience of moral properties on non-moral properties; Audi, unsurprisingly, concludes in favor of […]

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Notes on Audi’s Moral Knowledge & Ethical Character, pt I: Moral Epistemology

I’ve frequently criticized virtue ethics on this blog, so it seems worthwhile to comment on Robert Audi’s theories on moral realism, which seek to integrate an Aristotelian virtue conception into an otherwise intuitionistic Kantianism (or Kantian intuitionism; Audi admits either description of his view works, but as his epistemology is intuitionistic for the most part, […]

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Robert Audi on the Impersonality of Rational Desires

Since starting this blog, I have argued for moral realism in some form or other, but that is not to say that I have not entertained other metaethical positions before then – I used to be something of a moral nihilist that accepted morality as some type of social contract that was motivated by self-preservation. […]

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