Posts Tagged moral skepticism

Wedgwood on Moral Knowledge and Moral Epistemology pt. II

Section Three: The Epistemology of Normative Belief Part II: Disagreement and the A Priori Having articulated a theory of how we can come to have moral knowledge (see here), Wedgwood turns to whether such knowledge is a priori, and if so, how there can be such widespread moral disagreement. Wedgwood takes Kant’s work on the […]

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Nietzsche on Morality

Though many of the entries I’ve posted on this blog have been elucidations of a general theory of moral realism, I have admitted that looming skepticism does make moral nihilism plausible. In fact, for some time I accepted something close to an error theory, with the minimal metaphysical and epistemological commitments of contractualism, though I […]

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Notes on Audi’s Moral Knowledge & Ethical Character, pt I: Moral Epistemology

I’ve frequently criticized virtue ethics on this blog, so it seems worthwhile to comment on Robert Audi’s theories on moral realism, which seek to integrate an Aristotelian virtue conception into an otherwise intuitionistic Kantianism (or Kantian intuitionism; Audi admits either description of his view works, but as his epistemology is intuitionistic for the most part, […]

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Robert Audi on the Impersonality of Rational Desires

Since starting this blog, I have argued for moral realism in some form or other, but that is not to say that I have not entertained other metaethical positions before then – I used to be something of a moral nihilist that accepted morality as some type of social contract that was motivated by self-preservation. […]

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House of Cards’ Frank Underwood (and virtue ethics, moral explanations, and counterfactuals)

I tend to be skeptical of virtue ethics, on a metaethical level, due to the implausibility of attributing moral properties to persons – for me, moral properties seem like the sort of entity that might only obtain for actions and states of affairs – but Kevin Spacey’s Frank Underwood in House of Cards seems to […]

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Moral Naturalism and Non-Naturalism (and moral disagreement)

Note: I was working on an addition to my “About” page wherein I attempted to briefly state my meta-ethical views when I noticed that I had gotten carried away and written far more than was appropriate for the page. Thus I have decided to share it as a post.  Among metaethical options, I think that […]

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