Posts Tagged Ralph Wedgwood

Wedgwood on Moral Knowledge and Moral Epistemology pt. II

Section Three: The Epistemology of Normative Belief Part II: Disagreement and the A Priori Having articulated a theory of how we can come to have moral knowledge (see here), Wedgwood turns to whether such knowledge is a priori, and if so, how there can be such widespread moral disagreement. Wedgwood takes Kant’s work on the […]

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Wedgwood on Moral Knowledge and Moral Epistemology pt I

Section Three: The Epistemology of Normative Belief. Part I: The Status of Normative Intuitions (Part II will cover the next chapter of the section on moral epistemology, entitled, “Disagreement and the A Priori”) Wedgwood turns to the crucial question of how we might be justified in moral beliefs, using again the thesis that the intentional […]

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Wedgwood on the Compatibility of Naturalism and Irreducibility

An argument for the irreducible naturalism thesis is advanced in the next chapter, and Wedgwood’s intention is to show that irreducibility is compatible with naturalism, such that he is not arguing for naturalism, just for this compatibility thesis, and so assumes a strong version of naturalism, as by extension, if irreducibility is compatible with a […]

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Ralph Wedgwood on The Metaphysics of Normative Facts

Part Two: The Metaphysics of Normative Facts In part two of The Nature of Normativity, Wedgwood delves into the messy metaphysics of normativity, and takes some pretty remarkable positions, which include, that “the intentional is normative”, that normative facts are causally efficacious, and that though normative facts and mental states are irreducible, his view is […]

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Wedgwood’s Moral Semantics Program: Conceptual Role Semantics

It is now that Wedgwood posits his favored semantic theory for normative judgments, drawing inspiration from proponents of conceptual role semantics to argue that the nature of a concept is its role in thought and reasoning, and from this that the essential role of normative concepts is a regulative role in practical reasoning. This semantic […]

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Ralph Wedgwood on Cornell Realism and Australian Realism (moral semantics)

Having defeated expressivism (see here for his arguments) in a way that suggests the necessity of a truth-conditional semantics for normative statements, Wedgwood outlines what a factualist semantics must accomplish, and in so doing, reveals the failure of two factualist semantic theories: the causal theory put forward by the Cornell realists, and the conceptual analysis theory […]

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Ralph Wedgwood on Expressivism (moral semantics and truth)

Wedgwood sets his sight on the semantic project that is expressivism, the view that the fundamental explanations of the meaning of normative statements are the types of mental states that those statements express. This view is in contrast to the factualist approach, which holds that the fundamental explanation of the meaning of normative statements are […]

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