Posts Tagged moral non-naturalism

Review of Mark Timmons’ Morality Without Foundations pt II (of III): on Timmons’ Contextualist Semantics

Timmons initiates his presentation of his positive view in a thorough chapter on contextualist moral semantics, first providing a general introduction to the semantic program. In contrast to the correspondence view of truth (the view of realists), for a sentence to be true according to contextual semantics is for it to have correct assertibility, where […]

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Notes on Robert Audi’s Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character, pt II: Ethical Concepts and Moral Realism

Section II: Ethical Concepts and Moral Realism “Moral Epistemology and the Supervenience of Ethical Concepts” This essay focuses on the epistemological status of moral principles by attending to whether empiricism or rationalism is better suited for moral knowledge in light of the supervenience of moral properties on non-moral properties; Audi, unsurprisingly, concludes in favor of […]

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Review of “Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations”

Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations I tend to shy away from anthologies, as such collections often bring together essays not in proper dialogue (as opposed to an author’s dialogue with himself throughout the course of his book); this collection is an exception, most likely due to the narrow focus on a epistemological view in morality. In fact, […]

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On Moral Realism and Mind-Independence (and complex, non-natural properties)

Among non-natural moral realists there is a fascinating debate over whether basic moral properties, such as the properties of ‘goodness’ and ‘rightness’, are simple or complex properties. It is a fruitful debate to have, particularly because it seems many objections to non-naturalism have been against non-naturalist views that posit that ‘good’ is a simple property, […]

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Euthyphro pt I (and constructivism, and why we don’t need god for morality)

One of the more reoccurring debates I get involved in here on WordPress is whether or not an objective morality is possible for atheists. Most of the time this involves me commenting on posts that posit that secular morality isn’t possible, such that I take it upon myself to show theists where their critique of […]

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The Call of Duties pt II (Thoughts on Ross’s The Right and The Good [on partial knowledge, epistemic access, and luck])

In a previous entry, I explicated W.D. Ross’s argument that “morally right action” does not mean the same thing as “morally good action”, with special attention given to the premise that was the most essential to his argument: it is the not the case that it is obligatory to act from a good motive. His […]

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Moral Naturalism and Non-Naturalism (and moral disagreement)

Note: I was working on an addition to my “About” page wherein I attempted to briefly state my meta-ethical views when I noticed that I had gotten carried away and written far more than was appropriate for the page. Thus I have decided to share it as a post.  Among metaethical options, I think that […]

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