Posts Tagged naturalism vs non-naturalism

Review of Mark Timmons’ Morality Without Foundations pt II (of III): on Timmons’ Contextualist Semantics

Timmons initiates his presentation of his positive view in a thorough chapter on contextualist moral semantics, first providing a general introduction to the semantic program. In contrast to the correspondence view of truth (the view of realists), for a sentence to be true according to contextual semantics is for it to have correct assertibility, where […]

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Wedgwood on the Compatibility of Naturalism and Irreducibility

An argument for the irreducible naturalism thesis is advanced in the next chapter, and Wedgwood’s intention is to show that irreducibility is compatible with naturalism, such that he is not arguing for naturalism, just for this compatibility thesis, and so assumes a strong version of naturalism, as by extension, if irreducibility is compatible with a […]

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Notes on Robert Audi’s Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character, pt II: Ethical Concepts and Moral Realism

Section II: Ethical Concepts and Moral Realism “Moral Epistemology and the Supervenience of Ethical Concepts” This essay focuses on the epistemological status of moral principles by attending to whether empiricism or rationalism is better suited for moral knowledge in light of the supervenience of moral properties on non-moral properties; Audi, unsurprisingly, concludes in favor of […]

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Review of “Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations”

Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations I tend to shy away from anthologies, as such collections often bring together essays not in proper dialogue (as opposed to an author’s dialogue with himself throughout the course of his book); this collection is an exception, most likely due to the narrow focus on a epistemological view in morality. In fact, […]

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On Moral Realism and Mind-Independence (and complex, non-natural properties)

Among non-natural moral realists there is a fascinating debate over whether basic moral properties, such as the properties of ‘goodness’ and ‘rightness’, are simple or complex properties. It is a fruitful debate to have, particularly because it seems many objections to non-naturalism have been against non-naturalist views that posit that ‘good’ is a simple property, […]

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Euthyphro pt I (and constructivism, and why we don’t need god for morality)

One of the more reoccurring debates I get involved in here on WordPress is whether or not an objective morality is possible for atheists. Most of the time this involves me commenting on posts that posit that secular morality isn’t possible, such that I take it upon myself to show theists where their critique of […]

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Moral Twin Earth pt I (and the open question argument, Cornell realism, and the causal theory of reference)

One of the more reoccurring sci-fi plot devices is that of traveling to a “twin” earth, where persons are for the most part the same, except that different events have occurred; a recent heated debate in metaethics has been on what occurs when, stipulating that each party has discovered the objective moral truths of the […]

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