Posts Tagged Mark Timmons

Morality in Reservoir Dogs

I revisited one of my favorite films recently, the fiendishly repugnant, Reservoir Dogs, after a chance hearing of “Little Green Bag” in a commercial, the musical number that, over the opening credits, takes the audience from the pre-burglary breakfast to the post-burglary bloodbath. In reading some reviews and papers on the film, I noticed that […]

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Review of Mark Timmons’ Morality Without Foundations pt III (of III): on Timmons’ Contextualist Epistemology

Timmons then turns to matters of moral epistemology, arguing for a contextualist epistemology that borrows from foundationalist and coherentist views to develop an account of how regular persons can have justified moral beliefs – a criterion that he says the other epistemological views don’t take seriously enough. Timmons notes, before getting things going, that he […]

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Review of Mark Timmons’ Morality Without Foundations pt II (of III): on Timmons’ Contextualist Semantics

Timmons initiates his presentation of his positive view in a thorough chapter on contextualist moral semantics, first providing a general introduction to the semantic program. In contrast to the correspondence view of truth (the view of realists), for a sentence to be true according to contextual semantics is for it to have correct assertibility, where […]

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Review of Mark Timmons’ Morality Without Foundations pt I (of III)

Mark Timmons’ Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism is an indispensable contribution to contemporary metaethics, as it challenges deeply engrained assumptions of the field to articulate a new and exciting theory of moral irrealism. The book proceeds by articulating the criteria by which a metaethical theory must succeed; how the (at the time) […]

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Ralph Wedgwood on Cornell Realism and Australian Realism (moral semantics)

Having defeated expressivism (see here for his arguments) in a way that suggests the necessity of a truth-conditional semantics for normative statements, Wedgwood outlines what a factualist semantics must accomplish, and in so doing, reveals the failure of two factualist semantic theories: the causal theory put forward by the Cornell realists, and the conceptual analysis theory […]

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Moral Twin Earth pt I (and the open question argument, Cornell realism, and the causal theory of reference)

One of the more reoccurring sci-fi plot devices is that of traveling to a “twin” earth, where persons are for the most part the same, except that different events have occurred; a recent heated debate in metaethics has been on what occurs when, stipulating that each party has discovered the objective moral truths of the […]

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