Posts Tagged moral realism

The Is/Ought Gap pt. II: On Its Implications for Reductionism and Intuitionism

I’ve very much enjoyed the excellent discussions that have been occurring in the comments section of my recent post on the Is/ought gap. All of the commentators have been provocative and informative, but Larry posted some fantastically critical remarks of two positions I was advancing in that post, (I) that the is/ought thesis has no […]

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The Is/Ought Gap: It’s real but doesn’t pose a problem for “scientific moralists”

In the past two weeks I’ve stumbled upon blog entries that argued for a “scientific morality”, and in doing so challenged the “is/ought thesis”, which seems to be a rite of passage to be a naturalist these days. Unfortunately, the writers misunderstand the “is/ought” thesis, and so their arguments against it fail (but both entries […]

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Utilitarianism, Supererogatory Acts and the Demands of Morality

James Gray has posted a very interesting piece on the compatibility of act utilitarianism and supererogatory actions, a portion of which I want to discuss here. Supererogatory acts are those acts that would promote the most good, but which one is not morally required to do because of the large personal sacrifices they require. This type […]

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Review of Mark Timmons’ Morality Without Foundations pt II (of III): on Timmons’ Contextualist Semantics

Timmons initiates his presentation of his positive view in a thorough chapter on contextualist moral semantics, first providing a general introduction to the semantic program. In contrast to the correspondence view of truth (the view of realists), for a sentence to be true according to contextual semantics is for it to have correct assertibility, where […]

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“Frank is not a bad person though he does bad actions?” (Reblog)

Originally posted on The Horizon and The Fringe:
There is a lovely blog called AusomeAwestin, and for the purposes of this post, I will address the author as Awestin. I cannot tell to whom the blog belongs, but nobody just writes on Mark Timmons in metaethics without at the very least being either a graduate…

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Review of Mark Timmons’ Morality Without Foundations pt I (of III)

Mark Timmons’ Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism is an indispensable contribution to contemporary metaethics, as it challenges deeply engrained assumptions of the field to articulate a new and exciting theory of moral irrealism. The book proceeds by articulating the criteria by which a metaethical theory must succeed; how the (at the time) […]

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Wedgwood on Moral Knowledge and Moral Epistemology pt. II

Section Three: The Epistemology of Normative Belief Part II: Disagreement and the A Priori Having articulated a theory of how we can come to have moral knowledge (see here), Wedgwood turns to whether such knowledge is a priori, and if so, how there can be such widespread moral disagreement. Wedgwood takes Kant’s work on the […]

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